Using AWS security services to protect against, detect, and respond to the Log4j vulnerability

Using AWS security services to protect against, detect, and respond to the Log4j vulnerability


In this post we will provide guidance to help customers who are responding to the recently disclosed log4j vulnerability. This covers what you can do to limit the risk of the vulnerability, how you can try to identify if you are susceptible to the issue, and then what you can do to update your infrastructure with the appropriate patches.

The Log4j vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046) is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 3.1 base score of 10.0) in the ubiquitous logging platform Apache Log4j. This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform a remote code execution on the vulnerable platform. Version 2 of Log4j, between versions 2.0-beta-9 and 2.15.0, is affected.

The vulnerability uses the Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) which is used by a Java program to find data, typically through a directory, commonly a LDAP directory in the case of this vulnerability.

Figure 1, below, highlights the Log4j JNDI attack flow.

Figure 1. Log4j attack progression

Figure 1. Log4j attack progression. Source:, the Computer Emergency Response Team (GovCERT) of the Swiss government

As an immediate response, follow this blog and use the tool designed to hotpatch a running JVM using any Log4j 2.0+. Steve Schmidt, Chief Information Security Officer for AWS, also discussed this hotpatch.


Customers can use multiple AWS services to help limit their risk/exposure from the Log4j vulnerability. Customers can build a layered control approach, and/or pick and choose the controls identified below to help limit their exposure.


Customers can use AWS Web Application Firewall, following AWS Managed Rules for AWS WAF to help protect their Amazon CloudFront distribution, Amazon API Gateway REST API, Application Load Balancer, or AWS AppSync GraphQL API resources.

  • AWSManagedRulesKnownBadInputsRuleSet esp. the Log4JRCE rule which helps inspects the request for the presence of the Log4j vulnerability. Example patterns include ${jndi:ldap://}.
  • AWSManagedRulesAnonymousIpList esp. the AnonymousIPList rule which helps inspect IP addresses of sources known to anonymize client information.
  • AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet esp. the SizeRestrictions_BODY rule to verify that the request body size is at most 8 KB (8,192 bytes).

For customers using AWS WAF Classic, you will need to migrate to AWS WAF or create custom regex match conditions.

Customers who have multiple accounts can follow these instructions to use AWS Firewall Manager to deploy AWS WAF rules centrally across their AWS organization.

AWS Network Firewall

Customers can use Suricata-compatible IDS/IPS rules in AWS Network Firewall to deploy network-based detection and protection. Open source Suricata rules addressing Log4j are available from NCC Group here, from ET Labs here, and from CrowdStrike here. These rules can help identify scanning as well as post exploitation of the Log4j vulnerability. Because there is a large amount of benign scanning happening now, we recommend customers focus their time first on potential post exploitation activities, such as outbound LDAP traffic from their VPC to untrusted internet destinations.

We also recommend customers consider implementing outbound port/protocol enforcement rules that monitor or prevent instances of protocols like LDAP from using non-standard LDAP ports such as 53, 80, 123, and 443. Monitoring or preventing usage of port 1389 outbound may be particularly helpful in identifying systems that have been triggered by internet scanners to make command and control calls outbound. We also recommend that systems without a legitimate business need to initiate network calls out to the internet not be given that ability by default. Outbound network traffic filtering and monitoring is not only very helpful with Log4j, but other classes of vulnerabilities too.


This post has covered how to potentially limit the ability to exploit this vulnerability. Next, we’ll shift our focus to which AWS services can help to detect whether this vulnerability exists in your environment.

Figure 2. Log4j finding in the Inspector console

Figure 2. Log4j finding in the Inspector console

Amazon Inspector

As shown in Figure 2, the Amazon Inspector team has created coverage for identifying the existence of this vulnerability in your Amazon EC2 instances and Amazon Elastic Container Registry Images (Amazon ECR). With the new Amazon Inspector, scanning is automated and continual. Continual scanning is driven by events such as new software packages, new instances, and new common vulnerability and exposure (CVEs) being published.

For example, once the Inspector team added support for the Log4j vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228 & CVE-2021-45046), Inspector immediately began looking for this vulnerability for all supported AWS Systems Manager managed instances where Log4j was installed via OS package managers and where this package was present in Maven-compatible Amazon ECR container images. If this vulnerability is present, findings will begin appearing without any manual action. If you are using Inspector Classic, you will need to ensure you are running an assessment against all of your Amazon EC2 instances. You can follow this documentation to ensure you are creating an assessment target for all of your Amazon EC2 instances.


In addition to finding the presence of this vulnerability through Inspector, the Amazon GuardDuty team has also begun adding indicators of compromise associated with exploiting the Log4j vulnerability, and will continue to do so. GuardDuty will monitor for attempts to reach known-bad IP addresses or DNS entries, and can also find post-exploit activity through anomaly-based behavioral findings. For example, if an Amazon EC2 instance starts communicating on unusual ports, GuardDuty would detect this activity and create the finding Behavior:EC2/NetworkPortUnusual. This activity is not limited to the NetworkPortUnusual finding, though. GuardDuty has a number of different findings associated with post exploit activity that might be seen in response to a compromised AWS resource. For a list of GuardDuty findings, please refer to this GuardDuty documentation.

Security Hub

Many customers today also use AWS Security Hub with Inspector and GuardDuty to aggregate alerts and enable automatic remediation and response. In the short term, we recommend that you use Security Hub to set up alerting through AWS Chatbot, Amazon Simple Notification Service, or a ticketing system for visibility when Inspector finds this vulnerability in your environment. In the long term, we recommend you use Security Hub to enable automatic remediation and response for security alerts when appropriate. Here are ideas on how to setup automatic remediation and response with Security Hub.


The first two sections have discussed ways to help prevent potential exploitation attempts, and how to detect the presence of the vulnerability and potential exploitation attempts. In this section, we will focus on steps that you can take to mitigate this vulnerability. As we noted in the overview, the immediate response recommended is to follow this blog and use the tool designed to hotpatch a running JVM using any Log4j 2.0+. Steve Schmidt, Chief Information Security Officer for AWS, also discussed this hotpatch.

Figure 3. Systems Manager Patch Manager patch baseline approving critical patches immediately

Figure 3. Systems Manager Patch Manager patch baseline approving critical patches immediately

AWS Patch Manager

If you use AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager, and you have critical patches set to install immediately in your patch baseline, your EC2 instances will already have the patch. It is important to note that you’re not done at this point. Next, you will need to update the class path wherever the library is used in your application code, to ensure you are using the most up-to-date version.

Once identified, ECR container images will need to be updated to use Log4j version 2.16.0. Downstream, you will need to ensure that any containers built with a vulnerable ECR container image are updated to use the new image as soon as possible. This can vary depending on the service you are using to deploy these images. For example, if you are using Amazon Elastic Container Service (Amazon ECS), you might want to update the service to force a new deployment, which will pull down the image using the new Log4j version. Check the documentation that supports the method you use to deploy containers.

Mitigation strategies if you can’t upgrade

In case you either can’t upgrade to version 2.16.0, which disables access to JDNI by default, or if you are still determining your strategy for how you are going to patch your environment, you can mitigate this vulnerability by changing your Log4j configuration. To implement this mitigation in releases >=2.10, you will need to switch log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups to true by adding ‐Dlog4j2.formatMsgNoLookups=True to the JVM command for starting the application.

For a more comprehensive list about mitigation steps for specific versions, refer to the Apache website.


In this blog post, we outlined key AWS security services that enable customers to adopt a layered approach to help protect against, detect, and respond to their risk from the Log4j vulnerability. We urge customers to continue to monitor our security bulletins; we will continue updating our bulletins with our remediations efforts for our side of the shared responsibility model.

Given the criticality of this vulnerability, we urge customers to pay close attention to the vulnerability and appropriately prioritize implementing the controls highlighted in this blog.

This content was originally published here.

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